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The problem: malware hiding techniques
Malware wait before running to evade dynamic analysis
Ia fixed or dynamic period of time
Ia user input
Ia system event
Ian order from a remote server
Ia particular state of their hosted application
I something else ?
Existing solutions
Some frameworks proposed to test the infected application
1.using random inputs 2. running a maximal branches of code
BUT
1. it is uncertain 2. it is unnecessarily expensive
First step: static identification of malicious code
A scoring function computes an indicator of risk for each instruction in the bytecode.
The score increases with calls to specific Java methods such as:
Iandroid.telephony.SmsManager for sending SMS
Iandroid.telephony.TelephonyManager for getting device infos
Iandroid.context.pm.PackageManager for installing/removing apps
Ijava.util.Timer,TimerTask for the implementation of timebombs
Ijava.lang.Runtime,Process for executing native binaries
Idalvik.system.DexClassLoader for loading code dynamically
label3: $r6 = android.telephony.SmsManager.getDefault()
$r4 = com.savemebeta.GTSTSR.EXT SMS
$r3 = com.savemebeta.GTSTSR.SMS
$r6.sendTextMessage($r4, null, $r3, null, null)
return









Second step: recomputing an execution path to the identified malicious code
To compute an execution path to the most scored unit of code:
I∀ f, functions of the malware, compute:
Gf = (Vf , Af). Let G = ∪f Gf = (V,A)
I∀ intents, events from vi ∈ Vi to vj ∈ Vj:
Add (vi, vj) to A
ILet vk the scored unit of code
Let v0 the entry point (onCreate())
Compute path = shortest path(G, v0, vk)















$r2.sendTextMessage(”+3336303630”, null, ”PREMIUM”, null, null)
vk
$r2 = android.telephony.SmsManager.getDefault()
Third step: forcing the execution path
To force the execution of the most scored unit of code path:
IMake a standard execution
ILet path = (v1, ..., ve, ..., vk):
ve is the last unit of code executed.
I∀i > e > k, if vi is a condition, Force(vi)
IExecute the malware again.
Benefits:
Ia malware that is executed shows its effects
Idetection tools can be trained or evaluated
label3: $r6 = android.telephony.SmsManager.getDefault()
$r4 = com.savemebeta.GTSTSR.EXT SMS
$r3 = com.savemebeta.GTSTSR.SMS







v k-1 : forced jump!
vk
Forcing the malware
to change of branch:
Malware has been
executed!
Risk: +10
Risk: +10
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